Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co. by Powell, Lewis F., Jr.
Washington and Lee University School of Law
Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons
Supreme Court Case Files Powell Papers
10-1979
Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co.
Lewis F. Powell Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Powell Papers at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation




~-~~ • ~Lo~ : 
JtUt-v/-u,,_ f ~'f~ Wuw,!./.••f ~. ,,J . - £.u.r 4'ut,, ~ ' 
~ CAt(iTJ ~ ul (1,. . a.1t ,J,6 ,;t.. f 61<.., 
~ ~~ ~ ~ 
 ~ f 2 7 I (/) ( ,-J,.L-L td.rw-) 
- d_, ~~ e,-1 L ~ ~ 
~~ ~ . . 
CI/ s-'~  ~ ~ -~ 
~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~­
 cJ- ~ cA- s- s  
vf 72-71(__41 - ~/U_L) ~~ 
a~~ t-t.--~h4~ 
fl - PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM ( .$7 ~l j-
January 4, 1980 Conference ~ ~ ~ /1.t...O 
List 3, Sheet 2 
No. 79-669 
DAWSON CHEMICAL CO. 
v. 
ROHM-HAAS CO. 




1. SUMMARY: The question presented is whether§ 27l(d) of the 
patent law prohibits the owner of a "method" patent who has declined t o 
license other manufacturers to sell a non-patented component of the 
method, to recover for contributory infringement under§ 27l(c). 
2. FACTS: Resps brought suit in federal court alleging that petrs 
had infringed resps' patent. Resps' patent (called the Wilson Patent) is 
a method patent, describing a method of applying a chemical compound, 
known as "propanil" to weeds and established crops such as rice so as to 
inhibit selectively the growth of the weeds without adversely affecting 
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- - 2 -the crop. The chemical used in the process, pro! nil, is not itself pat-
ented. Nevertheless, the parties concede that the propanil is a 
..,_ --------
"nonstaple" commodity. In the field of patent law, this term indicates 
~
that the commodity, here the propanil, has no substantial commercial use 
apart from its use in the patented method. 
Resps manufacture propanil and sell it in containers bearing in-
structions on how to apply the chemical in accordance with the patented 
process. By operation of law, purchasers from resps receive implied 
licenses to use the purchased propanil in accordance with the patented 
method. Petrs also sell propanil in containers bearing labels which re-
commend only the methods of application described in the resps' patent. 
There is little dispute that petrs sold the propanil, knowing of the 
patent, and knowing that their customers would directly infringe the 
patent by following the method described on petr's containers. 
v 
The DC granted summary judgment in favor of petrs. The court con-
cluded that under 35 u.s.c. § 27l(d) a patent owner cannot recover for 
contributory infringement if he has engaged in "patent misuse." The 
court concluded that resps were guilty of misuse since they had not li-
censed any other manufacturers to produce propanil, the non-patented com-
ponent of the method patent. 
v-
The CA 5, in an exhaustive opinion, reversed. The court concluded 
that resps' decision to reserve to itself the manufacture and sale of a 
nonstaple, substantial component of the method patent was not "misuse" 
under§ 27l(d) preventing recovery for contributory infringement. The 
court therefore remanded for trial. 
There is no question that resolution of this case depends upon con-
gressional intent. Nevertheless, the CA found it necessary to examine 
years of this Court's precedents in the patent field in order to derive 
\ 
---
- 3 - -
congressional intent. Prior to the 1952 enactment of 35 u.s.c. § 27l(d) 
✓- this Court had decided a substantial number of contributory infringement 
and patent misuse cases, two very related doctrines relevant to the issue 
here. Contributory infringement was a court developed doctrine giving 
patent owners a right to bring suit against those who contributed to an 
infringement by furnishing to infringers the unpatented goods used in the 
invention. Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 213 U.S. 
325 (1909). Thereafter, the Court began to retreat from the doctrine of 
contributory infringement through the related doctrine of patent misuse. 
In Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co., 243 
U.S. 502 (1917) the Court held that a patentee may not require a pur-
chaser to purchase unpatented articles from the owner of the patent, even 
when those articles are necessary for use in conjunction with the 
=-
=-
patented product or method. The Court reasoned that as a matter of 
patent law, the monopoly granted by law should not extend to non-patented 
components. The Court overruled a prior decision in Henry v. A. B. Dick 
Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912) in which it held that it was permissible for a 
patent owner to derive its monopoly profit from the sale of supplies nec-
essary for use with the patented product. 
The culmination of the developing misuse theory occurred in 1944 in 
Mercoid Corp. v. Midcontinent Investment Co., 320 · U.S. 661 (1944). In 
Mercoid, the Court effectively extended the patent misuse theory to even 
those attempts to control the market for unpatented elements that had no 
use at all outside the patented invention. In dictum, the Court re-
cognized that this construction of the patent misuse theory was at odds 
with the contributory infringement doctrine espoused in Leeds & Catlin 
and declared that Leeds & Catlin was overruled. 
✓ 
There is no question that if Mercoid is still the law, resps would be 
-·-
-
- - 4 - -guilty of misuse since they have limited the availabiity of the right to 
use the patented method to those who purchase the unpatented chemical 
from them. The CA found, however, that§ 271 was intended to overrule 
Mercoid by permitting actions for contributory infringement, and ex-
emption from patent misuse, when the patent owner only seeks to control 
the sale of a nonstaple component which is a material part of the in-
vention. The statute provides: 
I 
Section 271. Infringement of patent 
(a) Excrpt as oth0rwise pro,ided in this title, who-
ever without authority makes, uses or sells any pat-
ented invention, within the United States during the 
· term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent. 
(b) ·whoever actively induces infringement of a 
patent shall be liable as an infringer. 
(c) ·whoever sells a component of a patented rna-
chiue, manufacture, combination or composition, or a · 
mateTial or a.pparatns for use in practici11g a patented 
process, constituting a material paTt of the invention, 
knowing the same to be especially made or especially 
adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, anu 
not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable 
for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as 
a contributory infringer. 
(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief 
for infringement or contributory infringement of a 
patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of mis-
use or illegal extension of ihe patent right by reason 
of his having done one or, more of the following: (1) 
deTived revenue from acts which if perfonned by an-
other without his consent would constitute contribu-
tory in-
[6539] 
fringement of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized 
another to perfonn acts which if performed without his 
consent would constitute contributorr infringement of 
the patent; (3) sought to enforce bis patent rights 
against infriugement on contributory infringement. 
The CA found that petrs had engaged in infringing conduct as de-
:e scribed in Subsection (c). The court further found that the resps had 
\ 
- - 5 - -
~- done only acts which under (d) could no longer be deemed patent misuse or 
illegal extension of the patent. The court rejected petr's argument that 
resps' failure to license the manufacture and sale of the unpatented 
element constituted misuse thereby disqualifying resps from the status of 
those "otherwise entitled to relief" as required by the statute. Never-
theless, the CA noted that both positions represented a plausible reading 
of the statute and commentary supporting both views was available. 
The CA outlines legislative history, some supportive of petr's 
reading of the statute, and other sections supportive of resps' reading. 
The CA found that the weight of the history supported resps' in-
terpretation relying heavily on testimony of Justice Department op-
ponents. The Justice Department complained that Subsection (d) would 
impair prior Supreme Court precedent establishing that patentees could 
~- not require users to purchase unpatented parts from him. 
• 
The CA could find no controlling Supreme Court precedent on the con-
struction of§ 271. The court did note, however, that several members of 
this Court have expressed the view that§ 271 merely codified patent law, 
including Mercoid and its result. Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible 
Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961) (Aro I), and Aro II, 377 U.S. 
476 (1964). The CA found that while not controlling, the "ex-
traordinarily complex opinions, on balance, probably cut against our 
view." 
3. CONTENTIONS: Vp'etr contends that the lower court construction i s 
inconsistent with the Supreme Court precedents which were codified by 
Congress in 1952. In addition, petr contends that review is neces s ary 
because the decision below is in conflict with a decision of the CA 2, 
Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 306 F.Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 448 
\ 
i-
- - 6 -
F.2d 872, (2nd Cir. 1971), as well as in tensio. ith views of§ 271 es-
poused by various members of this Court in Aro I and II. While not ad-
dressing the scope of§ 27l(d), the Court in Aro I relied on Mercoid and 
Justice Black, in a concurrence, specifically stated that§ 27l(d) was 
only intended to codify Mercoid. 
Resps rest primarily on the thorough decision of the CA. 
4. DISCUSSION: No other case cited directly 
trary to the construction adopted by the CA 5. Nevertheless, as the CA 
noted, there has been substantial dicta by some justices suggesting a 
contrary outcome. But -a dissenting opinion in Aro I construed§ 271 in 
accord with the CA5 here. In Ansul, one of the findings of the DC was 
that Uniroyal had misused its method patent by reserving to itself the 
sales of an unpatented chemical which controlled plant growth when ap-
plied in accordance with the patent instructions. While the case was 
~- tried principally on antitrust claims, this misuse holding of the lower 
~ 
court was affirmed by the CA 2 stating that: 
"Since Uniroyal could no longer lawfully use its 
method (use) patent monopoly to secure a monopoly 
over sales of the unpatented product [once it was 
established that the product was not patentable 
although the method was], it came under an ob-
ligation (if it wished to avoid the charge of 
patent misuse) to license its patented use of the 
unpatented product for those who wished to buy 
the product from other manufacturers." 
The CA 2 did not, however, address the effect of§ 271 on misuse. In 
fact, this discussion is contained only in a footnote affirming this 
aspect of the case. 448 F.2d at 882 n.4. Thus while the results do 
appear to be in conflict, these decisions do not represent a considered 
conflict. 
The CA makes a strong case for its construction of the statute, but, 
as the CA noted, petrs' construction, which has explicit support in 
\ 
- - _____ ,. .. _.,..,-.,,.. ... 
• - -- 7 -
; - Supreme Court decisions, is quite plausible as well. Given the sub-
stantial 7.re of the question, and the variance in the interpretations 
advanced, it might be appropriate to grant the petition without waiting 
for a more direct conflict. In light of the interrelationship of the 
antitrust prohibitions on tie-ins and governmental grants of patent mon-
opolies, it might be advisable to call for the views of the Solicitor 
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The SG has filed an amicus brief in support of the petition for 
cert. The SG contends that the decision will have important 
anticompetitive effects because it will discourage manufacturers holding -
process patents from offering licenses at reasonable royalties to 
competing sellers of unpatented products to be used in the patented 
process. Grants of such licenses have heretofore been common as a means 
of avoiding patent misuse challenges. The SG contends that the decision 
-> 
below is also incorrect. It is argued that§ 271 of the Patent Code must 
be interpreted II in 
\ 
light of this Nation's historical antipathy to 






- -... 2 -
monopoly and of repeated congressional efforts to preserve and foster 
competition." Deep South Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 
(1972). The SG does not contend that the statute or legislative 
unambiguously support his position, but argues that absent a more clear 
indication that Congress intended to depart from this Court's prior 










January 4, 1980 Conference 
List 7, Sheet 2 
No. 79-669 
DAWSON CHEMICAL CO., . 
v. 
ROHM & HAAS Co. 
Motion of Pesticide 
Producers Assn. for 
Leave to File amicus 
brief 
CA 5 · 
This motion was filed on Dec. 13, too late to be listed 
h the cert petn which is listed on p. 11. 
Amicus is an organization which represents pesticide 
producers, and their amicus brief contains factual and legal 
arguments. 
The Court usually grants these motions in spite of Rule 
42(1), which provides that such motions are not favored, and 
Vll\~ 
~~ 
- may only be filed a reasonable time prior to the consideration 
of the petn. 
'12/27 /79 Marsel 
~ 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
Mr. Justice Powell 15 April 1980 
From: Gregory May 
No. 79-669: Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co. 
Question Presented 
Does 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) eliminate the defense of 
patent misuse in situations where a patentee licenses use of a 
patented process only in connection with the sale of an 
unpatented product that has no substantial use except in the 
patented process? 
Background 
This case involves the interplay between two somewhat 
conflicting doctrines of patent law. The doctrine of 
II . . . ,'\ 
contributory infringement protects a patentee from those who 




- - 2. 
the components have no substantial use other than the 
It 
infringement of the patent. The doctrine of patent 
\\\ 
misuse, 
however, denies relief to a patentee who employs the patent to 
prevent others from trading in its unpatented components. 
Since the pivotal decision in Motion Picture Patents 
Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516 (1917), this 
Court has held rather consistently that a patentee may not use 
his patent to destroy competition in the unpatented articles of 
commerce that constitute his invent ion. In Carbice Corp. v. 
American Patents Develop. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931), the Court 
held that the holder of a combination patent had misused his 
monopoly by requiring all users to buy dry ice from an exclusive 
licensee. Dry ice was a staple article that had substantial 
noninfringing uses, and the patent gave its holder no right to 
restrict competition in that commodity. 
The companion cases of Mercoid Core. v. Mid-
Continental Investment Co. , 3 20 U.S. 6 61 ( 1 944) , and Mercoid 
Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 
( 1944), gave the patent misuse defense even wider play. The 
patentee in those cases held a combination patent for a heating 
system. Its exclusive licensee relicensed the patent only to 
those whri purchased from it an unpatented stoker switch 
contained within the invent ion. The patentee and the 1 icensee 
sought relief from contributory infringement by an unlicensed 
seller of the stoker switches. The switch had no material use 
-
-
- - 3. 
other than as a part of the patented heating system. This Court 
denied relief on the ground that the patentee had mi sued its 
patent to control the market in unpatented switches. Reduced to 
patent jargon, the holding established that a patentee cannot 
condition the granting of licenses on the purchase of an 
unpatented nonstaple. 
The Mercoid decisions left the doctrine of 
contributory infringement in a state of confusion. Indeed, some 
courts even found patent misuse in the act of bringing suit to 
prevent another from selling unpatented components of a patented 
product. See, e.g., Stroco Prods. v. Mullenbach, 67 U.S.P.Q. 
168 (S.D. Cal. 1944). In 1948, against this background of 
uncertainty, Congress began hearings on what became the Patent 
Act of 1952. The legislative history best set out in resp' s 
brief, at 26-43, shows that the provision now codified at 35 -
1 ( U.S. C. § 271 was intended to quiet the conflict between the ' >- . .- .. A. I .,,,,_,,,,_____ - '" I l \ \ 
~~ contributory infringement ~ d patent misuse doctrines. Section 
271(c) contains a rather precise definition of contributory 
infringement, and related provisions in § 271 (d) confine the 
defense of patent misuse. 
-
Discussion 
The parties agree that resp's conduct constitutes 




- - 4. 
Thus, the quest~ n in suit i..:, w~ er 35 u.s.c. § 271(d) Q 
overruled those decisions in relevant part. A related question 
is whether resp's conduct constitutes misuse because it is not 
among the acts permitted by§ 271(d). 
I. Statutory Language 
A. Extension of the Patent 
The statutory language dealing with contributory 
infringement and patent misuse draws a distinction between -•1 •' I L \"\ 
staple and nonstaple components of an invention. -- ._ 
creates liability for contributory infringement only when the 
offender sells "a material part of the invention, knowing the 
same to be expecially made or especially adapted for use in an 
infringement of [the] patent, and not a staple article or 
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use 
" [Reprinted at Brief for Petr 3.] Thus, the sale of a 
material part of an invention does not constitute contributory \r-
infringement unless the article sold has no substantial use 
other than in the infringement of the patent. A patent, in 
other words, does give the patentee some control over the market 
in unpatented nonstaple components. 
- -- -
~ ct ion 271 (~ contains symmetrical 
designed to abrogate the defense of patent misuse 
provisions 
in suits for 
contributory infringement. The subsection provides that no 




- - 5. 
f27l~J ~ 
~
contributory infringement" shall be "deemed guilty of misuse or 
illegal extension of the patent right" for having done "one or 
more" of three acts: 
"(1) derived revenue from acts which if performed 
by another without his consent would constitute 
contributory infringement of the patent; 
" ( 2) 1 icensed or authorized another to perform 
acts which if performed without his consent would 
constitute contributory infringement of the patent; 
"(3) sought to enforce his patent rights against 
infringement or contributory infringement." 
[Reprinted at Brief for Petr 3-4.] Thus, a patentee does not 
misuse his patent by making it his business to sell unpatented 
nonstaples--an act "which if performed by another without his 
consent would constitute contributory infringement" under § 
271(c). In other words, § 271(d) appears to overrule the 
Mercoid decision in so far as it prevented a patentee from 
trading in nonstaple components of his invention. ---------~---------
B. Application in this Case 
' .A~✓ ,, \\. y~ 1 clear that the patent act allows resp to market propanil and to 
If this reading of§ 271 is correct, it seems rather 
II"" J/ ~ prevent others from marketing it. 
~--,1; 
Propanil is conceeded to be a 
apparently had no use at al 1 until one ~ nonstaple; indeed, it 
~ ,t,A;O Wilson developed the method for application to which resp holds 
~ W~ the patent. The remaining question is whether resp is not 
.,r/-" ¥' ~ therwise entitled to relief" because it has granted licenses 
t2v+~ for use of the patented method, but only those ~ who buy 
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Resp does not actually grant licenses. Rather, 
implied licenses to perform the patented method accrues to 
propanil buyers under the principle that "the authorized sale of 
an article which is capable of use only in practicing the patent 
is a relinquishment of the patent monopoly with respect to the 
article sold." United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 
249 (1942). Resp could avoid the tying effect of its sales only 
by (1) making no sales or (2) granting licenses to other 
propanil manufacturers or to those who consume the material. 
Since § 271(d)(1) allows patentees to sell unpatented nonstaples 
like propanil, the underlying question is whether the law bars 
patentees from withholding licenses that would allow others to 
sell a nonstaple. 
The statute does not address this question 
but two considerations suggest that the law raises no 
First, such a holding would compel licensing. 
in terms, { 
such bar. 
Compulsory 
licensing is inconsistent with the fundamental notion that a 
patent holding "is neither bound to use his discovery himself 
nor permit others to use it." Continental Bag Co. v. Eastern 
Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 425 (1908). Th is Court has 
compelled licensing only as a remedy for particular wrongdoing, 
such as price-fixing. See, e.g., United States v. Glaxo Group, 
Ltd., 410 U.S. 52 (1973); Besser Mfg. Co. v. United States, 343 
U.S. 444 (1952). Second, it seems unlikely that Congress 
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market in unpatented nonstaples had it believed that the tying 
effect arising through implied licensing amounted to patent 
misuse. In other words, resp' s straight-forward argument that 
it has done nothing more than sell a nonstaple as permitted by§ 
271(d)(1) has considerable force. The statutory gloss for which 
petr contends would mean that§ 271(d) (1) affords no protection 
to a patentee who sells a nonstaple having no noninfringing use 
unless the patentee also grants licences under § 271(d) (2). 
Since a material is a nonstaple only if it has no "substantial 
noninfringing use,"§ 271(c), all significant conduct allowed by 
§ 271(d) (1) would be wrongful unless coupled with conduct 
allowed by § 271 (d) (2). That reading seems inconsistent with 
the statutory declaration that a patentee may do "one or more" 
of the acts enumerated in§ 271(d)(1)-(3). ~ 
~~~~ 
. 451.,'1/WflA--~) 
Legislative History (MA-~__,~~~~~~/ ,Jo,--
. ~ ~-r-- ~ 
II. 
Having concluded Ehae the statutory language supports 
resp's position, one turns to the legislative history for -
contrary indications. The SG--in favor of the petr--and the 
resp summarize the history that supports their respective 
positions. See Brief for the United States 16-24; Brief for 
Resp 26-43. Neither the committee reports nor the floor debates 
are very illuminating on the\ question in this case, al though 
they do suggest that the patent bill was presented more as a 
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Th-~ 
Testimony by the actual drafters of the bill, however, --- ______ ,,,,,,,.._ -flatly declares that § 271(d) was intended to overrule Mercoid 
in so far as that decision would apply to this case. Giles -
Rich ·, now a judge of the C.C.P.A., told the committee that § 
~ . 
271 ( d) "would reverse the result in the Mercoid case; it would 
not reverse the result in the Carbice case." Quoted at Brief 
for Resp 36. In other words, a patentee misuses his patent by 
granting licenses only to those who buy staples from him 
(Carbice), but he now may grant licenses only to those who 
nonstaples from him (Mercoid). Congressman Rogers expressed the 
~ e understanding of the biJ l. See id. , at 41. And the 
Justice Department, opposing the bill with arguments very like 
those contained in its brief in this case, said that § 271(d) 
"would have the ef feet of wiping out a good deal of the law 
relating to misuse of patents, particularly with reference to 
tying-in clauses." Quoted id., at 40. 
Rich's explanation for this result is quite logical. 
~
---:,. 
"[T]o put any measure of contributory infringement into law you 
must, to that extent and to that extent only, specifically make 
exceptions to the misuse doctrine, and that is the purpose of 
paragraph (d)." Quoted id., at 39. At an earlier hearing, Rich 
had specifically addressed the rationale for preventing 
contributory infringement in a case just like this one. " [ o] ne 
who supplies a hitherto unused chemical to the public for use in 




- - 9. 
property of this chemical which made the new method possible. 
To enjoin him from distributing the chemical for use in the new 
method does not prevent him from doing anything which he could 
do before the new property of the chemical had been discovered." 
Quoted id., at 31. 
III. Case Law 1-u~~~-
CA5 very forthrightly summarized the cases in which 
this Court has considered the scope of § 271. See Petn for Cert 
A-42 - A-48. The actual holding in each case sheds light on the 
issue now presented, and no majority of the Justices joined 
dicta that would lend much assistance. Aro Mfg. Co. v. 
Convertible Tqp Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961), turned on 
whether fabrics sold by an alleged contributory infringer were 
used in permissible repair or impermissible reconstruction of 
the patented combination. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top 
Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476 (1964), simply held that persons 
who bought the same patented combination from a manufacturer not 
licensed to sell it had no right to use--let alone repair--the 
invention. (Nothing in Aro II necessarily warrants CA5's 
concession that some of the Court's language cuts against the 
result reached in this case.) Finally, Deepsouth Packing Co. v. 
Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 516 (1972)--although saying that a 
patent monopoly would not be treated expansively absent some 




- - 1 0. 
contributory infringement did not prevent an unlicensed 
manufacturer from selling component nonstaples for assembly 
abroad. 
Summary 
1. Resp' s conduct rather clearly comes within the 
protective provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 271 (d). That subsection 
- - -------- -- -
was designed to eliminate the patent misuse defense in 
situations where the patentee 
h 
~ . 
conduct tat would constitute 
" by an unlicensed competitor. 
engaged in no conduct other than 
contributory infringement if done 
2. The legislative history quite clearly shows that 
the drafters of the 1952 Patent Act i-trt----e-nded § 271(d) to - ------- -- ( (--.;--_ 
overrule this Court's decision in the Mercoid cases and to allow 
a patentee some substantial control over the market in 
nonstaples--which have little use other than infringement of his 
patent. The drafters perceived that preservation of the 
doctrine of contributory infringement required a matching 
contraction of the doctrine of patent misuse. 
3. No opinion of this Court provides much guidance on 
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